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Abstract 
The paper discusses the key issues involved in evaluating credit guarantee programs for 
agricultural and small enterprise lending in developing countries. A review of results of evaluations 
shows that there is little quantitative information to clearly support the use of guarantee programs 
to stimulate lending in developing countries. 
EVALUATING CREDIT GUARANTEE PROGRAMS 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
by 
Richard L. Meyer and Geetha Nagarajan1 
Credit guarantees are advocated for many developing countries as a means to entice reluctant 
lenders into lending to clientele groups of interest to governments and donors, such as agriculture, 
small farmers, women, microenterprises, and the poor. It is usually assumed that a major 
impediment to formal sector lending is the perceived risk associated with such loans. By reducing 
default risk through a guarantee, it is expected that lenders will make more loans to credit rationed 
clients. By offering partial guarantees, more borrowers are benefitted than would occur if the same 
ft..mds were used to rediscount targeted loans. Furthermore, it is expected that the lenders will learn 
that these clientele groups are not so risky, so they will lend to them in the future without the need 
for guarantees. 
Guarantee programs are funded in several ways. An external source often provides the initial 
capital for the guarantee fund. Recent innovations, based on the concept of mutual credit 
associations, use group-based savings deposited in a bank account to guarantee loans made to group 
members. Donors and NGOs may complement these local savings with a second tier guarantee to 
leverage the funds lent. Women's World Banking, for example, deposits funds in local banks to 
leverage the funds deposited by local WWB affiliates for use as loan guarantees. 
1 The authors are Professor and Research Specialist, respectively, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210. Phone No. (614)-292-8014; Fax No. 
(614)-292-7362 
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The impact of credit guarantees is unclear and there is plenty of skepticism by both theorists 
and practitioners. Since most crop insurance programs that cover specific insurable risks are 
subsidized, it is logical to expect that a comprehensive credit guarantee with its severe advers~ 
selection and moral hazard problems would be even less viable. Many skeptics conclude that 
guarantees represent subsidized credit dressed in new clothes. On the other hand, governments, 
donors and bankers often advocate guarantees so they have been introduced in several developing 
countries. 
No comprehensive evaluation of loan guarantees has been conducted since the study 
conducted by Levitsky and Prasad in 1987. They concluded that it was difficult to demonstrate that 
much additional lending actually occurred because of small and medium business loan guarantees. 
Subsequent empirical evidence has been mixed. ACCION International claims that its guarantee 
schemes are a major reason for the recent expansion in microenterprise lending Latin America. The 
large agricultural credit guarantee scheme in Nigeria, however, covered only a small portion of 
agricultural lending in the early 1980s. But the enormous bad debts associated with agricultural 
lending were expected to eventually destroy the guarantee fund. The major guarantee programs in 
Colombia and Mexico have also experienced difficulties with fund viability. 
The objective of this paper is to summarize a study of guarantee programs we recently 
completed. In the paper we first discuss the key issues involved in evaluating credit guarantees. 
Then we review the results of evaluations that have been conducted of guarantees for agricultural 
and small enterprise lending in developing countries. We conclude the paper with some general 
observations about credit guarantees. 
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II. Evaluating Credit Guarantee Schemes: Key Issues 
Considering the relatively long time that credit guarantees have been used in the U.S. ac1.d 
abroad to influence lending, surprisingly few good comprehensive evaluations have been conducted. 
At least four reasons can be identified that explain this situation. 
• Methodological complexity. The difficulty of analyzing the impact of credit programs 
is well understood (David and Meyer; Von Pischke and Adams; MSI, Feb. 1990). An important 
attribute of money is its fungibility; it can be used for a variety of uses and one unit from one source 
is completely substitutable for one unit from another source. Fungibility makes money a valuable 
commodity but creates a problem when evaluating the impact of a borrower getting a loan, especially 
if it was intended for a specific purpose. Assume that a loan was intended for a particular purpose, 
say, buy a production input. The borrower may not have been able to buy the input without the loan. 
In this case, the loan 11Caused" the purchase of the input, and the "additionality" attributable to the 
loan is the full value of the input purchase. Alternatively, the borrower may have purchased the 
input even without the loan, but with it is able to use his own resources for other purposes. The 
additionality lfcaused" by the loan is whatever the borrower did with the resources previously 
destined for the purchase. When loan monitoring is la"X or difficult, the borrower may divert the loan 
funds earmarked for the input to different purposes. 
To assess the impact of a loan it is necessary to estimate the "counter factual/' that is, what 
would the borrower have done without the loan, then compare that with what was done with the loan. 
The counter factual can never be measured so some proxy is needed. Frequently this involves 
comparing the current situation of borrowers with some earlier baseline data, and attributing some 
portion of the observed changes to borrowing. Alternatively, the performance of borrowers (the 
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treatment group) is compared with nonborrowers (the control group) and any improvement observed 
in the treatment group 1s attributed to borrowing. 
These attempts have obvious limitations. First, they don't completely control for those 
factors, in addition to borrowing, that affect a borrower's performance over time. Second, problems 
of self selection imply that borrowers may be systematically different from nonborrowers. These 
inherent d1fferences may imply that borrowers will perform better even without loans than will 
nonborrowers (Adams). Furthermore, if lenders succeed in screening their borrowers to select those 
most likely to repay, we should expect that borrowers will be different from nonborrowers. 
Alternatively some nonborrowers may not try to borrow for fear of being credit rationed by lenders. 
Thus, borrowers may outperform nonborrowers because they take more risks than nonborrowers. 
These problems of credit evaluation also exist for evaluations of guarantee programs. It is 
difficult to evaluate credit guarantees without knowing what lenders and borrowers would have done 
without access to guarantees. Furthermore, the incidence of guarantee programs is not random 
because not all lenders and borrowers have access to them. Those with access may have inherent 
qualities different from those without access. Furthermore, the "treatment" in a credit guarantee is 
often multifaceted, that is there is a guarantee plus something else. For example, there may be a 
quota for banks to lend to small enterprises. This quota may "cause" the banks to consider making 
loans they are convinced are unprofitable. If a guarantee is offered, they may accept it to reduce 
expected losses. If the quota is removed, they may refuse to make the loans even with guarantees. 
In some cases guarantees are offered as part of an integrated package including training and technical 
assistance. Evaluating the guarantee involves disentangling the effects of the other elements of the 
package. 
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II Expense. Resolving these methodological problems implies costs to carefully design 
studies, collect data, and employ appropriate analytical techniques. An example of a robust 
methodology is the paper by Pitt and Khandker on the World Bank's comprehensive study of credit 
for the poor in Bangladesh. Nothing else approaching this effort has been found in the guarantee 
literature. Improvements in evaluation methodology can be made by having lenders regularly collect 
and report data on their loans. This approach raises lender transaction costs, however, and although 
usefhl for evaluators the information has little value in helping the lenders monitor and improve their 
operations. Therefore, they have little incentive to carefully collect these data. 
II Competing objectives. The objectives of the three agents - guarantor, lender and 
borrower- may conflict and some guarantee programs are unclear about their objectives. Rhyne 
analyzed this problem in the U.S. Small Business Administration guarantee program. If the 
guarantee is designed to reduce credit market failure, the issue of impact on borrowers is less 
significant. The crucial issue is whether or not market failure is reduced. However, if the guarantee 
is designed to stimulate economic growth, it is important to determine if the firms of guaranteed 
borrowers grow faster than nonguaranteed borrowers. Clear objectives help identify what data are 
needed for an evaluation to determine if objectives are being met. 
11 Incentives. The last reason for few comprehensive evaluations concerns the lack of 
incentives. Rhyne's analysis of the SBA illustrates the lack of demand for good information. Often 
there is a demand for governments, donors, and banks to assist a target group such as micro 
enterprises in developing countries. The easiest way to respond and spend money, short of making 
subsidized loans, may be to fund a guarantee program. Immediate political benefits may be obtained 
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by creating the program. Even if it accomplishes little or produces unexpected negative results, the 
problems may emerge only during the next political admmistration. 
III. Impacts of Guarantees: A Review 
Evaluations of guarantee schemes must assess impacts on three agents -guarantor, lender and 
borrower. Most evaluations, however, have been limited to a few issues the author(s) have been 
commissioned to study or believe to be most important. Since the objectives of many schemes are 
vague, evaluations are often unclear about what to measure, and how to evaluate the positive and 
negative impacts on the three agents. Many schemes do not collect initial baseline data so evaluators 
have difficulty in clearly determining what changes have occurred during the life of a guarantee. 
• Impact on the Guarantor 
The first important aspect to evaluate is the status of the fund or annual appropriations used 
to cover operations and loan losses. The data and anecdotes available suggest that many programs 
fail because the payments to lenders for loan losses exceed the revenues and reserves of the 
guarantee funds. For example, the Nigerian Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme was set up in 
1977 with a capital fund of Nl 00 million to stimulate lending to small farmers. It was slowly 
decapitalized because the operating costs and claims in several years exceeded investment income. 
In 1988 about 15 percent of the guaranteed loans were reported in default (Njoku and Obasi). 
Gehring ( 1995) recently reported on the status of 12 Latin American guarantee schemes. 
Two existed for over two years, are insufficiently used arid show deficits, but possess sufficient 
assets to cover guarantees and losses. A third microenterprise scheme was restructured two years 
ago, and so far shows good results. The other nine have no assets left or have been closed. Some 
failed because of poor design, others because of poor management and undiversified investment 
7 
strategies, and in other cases, through corruption or political intrigue, guaranteed loans were granted 
to borrowers with no intention of repaying. 
If complete information were available, we suspect it would show that the financial landscape 
in developing countries is littered with failed guarantee schemes. There are allegations that some 
guarantee funds have failed to pay losses or have dragged out the payment process to avoid 
exhausting the fund. It appears that many guarantee schemes have been set up and are viable for a 
few years. Then loan losses emerge and eventually mushroom; the fund is recapitalized, and the 
cycle starts again. The Credit Guarantee Corporation in Nepal illustrates the problem. It guarantees 
commercial bank loans to small enterprises. Although it guaranteed less than half of the loans made 
to the priority sectors in the mid-1980s and many defaulted loans were never submitted for claims, 
the fund failed and had to be recapitalized (Kongsiri). 
Little information exists about the efficiency of fund operations. Some funds provide global 
portfolio guarantees so they avoid the task of evaluating applications for individual guarantees. 
Schemes with selective guarantees, however, require staff to review individual loans proposed for 
guarantees. The efficiency of this process influences operating costs, and the transaction costs and 
waiting time borne by banks and borrowers. The agricultural loan guarantees made in Mexico by 
FEGA (Fonda Especial de Asistencia Tecnica y Garantia para Creditos Agropecuarios) illustrates 
the problem (World Bank). The FEGA staff essentially replicate the functions of and, in some cases, 
substitute for bank staff in appraising, monitoring and collecting loans. These services were free 
untill988 when charges of two to three percent ofthe value ofloans made were introduced, but this 
income has been too low to cover high administrative costs and loan losses. 
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Guarantees financed by annual appropriations offer an advantage with respect to public 
policy because their costs are more transparent than programs funded by endowments. One problem 
with endowed funds is that they are often assumed to have zero opportunity cost. If the fund 
survives without further capitalization, this implicit subsidy is disguised and may never be evaluated 
relative to any benefits obtained. Analysis of the accounts of the Fondo Nacional de Garantia in 
Colombia revealed that the implicit subsidy amounted to almost 8 percent per year over the period 
1982 to 1994 (Gudger). The annual premiums charged guaranteed loans would have to be raised 
from their average level of 4.8 percent to 12.6 percent for the fund to break even. 
• Impact on Lenders 
Analyzing impacts of guarantees on lenders is more difficult than measuring financial aspects 
of the fund. Ifthe guarantee accomplishes its objectives, lenders will increase lending to the target 
client and/or the terms will be softer (reduced collateral requirements, lower interest rates, longer 
term, etc.). Through learning by doing the lenders may begin to make the same loans without 
guarantees, and guaranteed borrowers who perform well may graduate to unguaranteed loans. 
Lenders may use guarantees as a marketing tool to attract clients for their other products. In 
secondary markets, guarantees may increase the marketability of loans made with low collateral 
requirements or loan to income ratios. If guarantees are designed or implemented poorly, they can 
have negative impacts. The guarantee could induce laxness in loan screening, monitoring and 
collections. Lenders could experience a reduction in return on assets because transaction costs and 
delays in loan processing rise. Lenders can suffer losses if the guarantor lacks the funds to cover 
losses or the delays in payment raise costs and lower the real value of the compensation received. 
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A necessary condition for a guarantee to make a positive impact on lenders is that loans are 
actually guaranteed. Some guarantees fail for lack of demand. For example, a guarantee for small 
and medium enterprise loans in Botswana guaranteed only 40 loans between 1988 and 1990, and 
they represented only 18 percent ofthe available guarantee fund (MSI, Nov. 1990). 
Simply making guarantees is insufficient evidence of success for most programs, however, 
because their usual objective is additionality, i.e., lenders make loans that otherwise would not h;lYe 
been made. The few studies that carefully test for additionality have produced mixed results. Two 
reports analyzed the ACCION International guarantee for its affiliates in Mexico, Chile, Paraguay 
and Costa Rica (MSI, 1990; Painter). AID established a U.S. $1 million guarantee facility through 
a loan to ACCION International. The loan was deposited in a U.S. bank which issued standby letters 
of credit to Latin American banks that lent their own resources to local A CCI ON affiliates for on-
lending to micro enterprises. With the guarantee, the affiliates were able to augment their resources 
and increase their lending to customers unable to access regular bank loans. Since they had limited 
access to other funds, the resources available through the guarantee probably resulted in loans to 
micro enterprises in approximately the same amount, that is most of the loans probably would not 
have been made without the guarantee. The additionality argument is harder to make for large 
institutions with abundant resources. In this situation loans supposedly made because of a guarantee 
may simply substitute for some loans the institution would have made anyway. 
Determining additionality due to several guarantee schemes in the Philippines has been 
difficult. One study analyzed a private development bank in the Northern Mindanao region (Llanto 
and Casuga). In October of 1991, about 15 percent of its outstanding loans were guaranteed through 
one of the guarantees operated by the Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund. The borrowers were 
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mainly small farmers unable to provide the collateral normally required by the bank. Over 300 
farmers received guaranteed loans from November 1987 to July 1991. The guarantee alone, 
however, could not be credited with these loans because the bank used a "systems" approach in 
which the borrowers received technical information, production inputs, and a secure market. This 
combinatiOn made the borrowers creditworthy. Even so, about 10 percent of the outstanding loans 
were in default in July 1991 and claims for guarantee payments filed in 1989 were still unpaid in 
February 1992 because of a dispute between the bank and guarantor over documentation. 
An earlier study by Magno and Meyer analyzed how several guarantees affected the supply 
of agricultural credit during the early 1980s. In this period the Filipino banks generally decreased 
their agricultural lending while the ratio of guaranteed to total agricultural loans rose from less than 
2 to 5 percent. The ratio was higher for medium sized private development banks than for the large 
commercial banks and, surprisingly, for small rural banks. Since the guarantee schemes also had 
a rediscounting facility, some substitution of fund sources probably occurred. An important reason 
for the low participation rate of many banks was the additional transaction costs required for 
guaranteed loans. 
Two Filipino banks participating in a small and medium scale enterprise guarantee were 
evaluated (MSI, Feb., 1990). The majority of the targeted loans financed exports or imports by local 
producers and a few provided long-term investment credit. Both banks claimed that the guarantee 
enabled them to lend to borrowers not otherwise qualified. One bank estimated that 80 percent of 
the guaranteed loans would not have been extended because of borrower lack of collateral and the 
bank's policy of discouraging loans to borrowers without a credit history. No data were presented, 
however, to substantiate these claims. 
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These studies suggest that guarantees have had a mixed record in influencing lenders to make 
loans they are reluctant to make without guarantees. The ACCION example is one in which lender-
borrower relationships developed because of the guarantee so that subsequent loans were made 
without guarantees. The guarantee enabled the affiliates to make micro enterprise loans. In some 
cases, however, lender participation has been limited because the guarantee was unattractive or the 
credibility of the guarantee facility was questioned. Additionality has been difficult to determine. 
The analysis undertaken to detennine the impact of guarantees has often not been robust enough to 
produce credible results. 
Impact on Borrowers 
Measuring impact on borrowers is complex in part because there are debates about what to 
measure. An important question is additionality: did previously rationed borrowers receive loans 
and/or larger loans than would have occurred without the guarantee. A second question is whether 
or not the terms ofloans for the target clientele became softer. Third, some sceptics of the role of 
credit in development want evidence about how borrowers actually benefited, that is did they 
produce more, earn a higher income, live better, etc. Fourth, a comprehensive analysis would also 
analyze impact on nonguaranteed borrowers. They might face higher interest rates if lenders charge 
them to cross-subsidize lower returns earned from guaranteed loans or they may be crowded out if 
lenders allocate scarce funds to guaranteed borrowers. Unsubsidized borrowers compete with 
borrowers who receive subsidized guarantees so a complete analysis would account for any losses 
in production, sales and profits they might experience because of this competition. Since this 
analysis is rarely attempted, most impact studies probably overestimate the benefits of guarantees. 
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An evaluation of a small enterprise guarantee in Botswana showed that guaranteed borrowers 
seemed to experience an increase in sales revenue but little additional employment compared to 
nonguaranteed borrowers in a small sample of20 observations (MSI, Nov. 1990). The evaluations 
of the ACCION guarantee found that many of the micro entrepreneurs who borrowed after the 
guarantees were issued were previous customers so no great expansion of borrowers occurred (MSI, 
1990, Painter). The evaluators tried to reconstruct the firms' assets, sales, profits and employment 
before becoming borrowers for comparison with the current situation. Positive changes were noted 
but the evaluators cautioned that the results could not all be attributed to the guarantee. Interviews 
with borrowers revealed that many would not have gotten loans without the ACCION programs nor 
would their enterprises have performed as well. 
Comprehensive attempts to measure borrower impact in the Philippines have produced mixed 
results depending on the specific source of guarantee, the type of lender, the time the analysis was 
conducted, and the sample of borrowers studied. All the studies lacked benchmark information and 
were forced to reconstruct data for the enterprises or rely on impressions of lenders and borrowers. 
The study of the Mindanao development bank revealed that 14 out of 20 farmers interviewed did not 
even know that their loans were guaranteed even though they had to pay guarantee fees (Llanto and 
Casuga). It appeared that the bank made loans to some customers without the collateral normally 
required ofborrowers. It was not possible to determine if this could be attributed to the guarantee 
or to other elements of the systems approach used in lending. 
Bautista studied 17 Filipino banks ofvarious types serving agricultural clients. His results 
raise doubts about the additionality of guarantees because the majority of borrowers had previous 
bank relationships, the loans were fully secured or the borrowers possessed good credit relationships, 
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and the majority of the banks reported they would have granted the loans without guarantees. The 
reasons the banks participated was due more to the complementary features, such as interest 
subsidies and liquidity and rediscount features, rather than risk sharing designed to expand loans 
to rationed customers. 
The comprehensive analysis conducted by Llanto and Magno involved a survey of borrowers 
and nonborrowers of three programs selected in three regions. Guarantees did not affect the size of 
loans received because the banks and cooperatives follow a set formula in making production loans. 
Some guaranteed borrowers were able to get lower interest rates than nonguaranteed borrowers 
because of rediscount facilities available with guarantees. Procedures were streamlined so the 
transaction costs for guaranteed and nonguaranteed borrowers were similar, but waiting times for 
loan disbursement were still longer for guaranteed loans. Borrowers faced higher costs because of 
guarantee fees accessed to them and they may receive few offsetting benefits in the form of increased 
additionality in lending. 
An evaluation of the small and medium enterprise guarantee in the Philippines found that 
loan maturities and interest rates were roughly the same for guaranteed and nonguaranteed 
borrowers, but collateral requirements were sometimes less (MSI, February 1990). The evaluators 
tried to reconstruct the performance of borrower firms over time in terms of growth in gross revenue, 
net income, employment, and exports and foreign exchange earnings. These estimates suggested 
that 5 to 75 percent of the observed changes could be attributed to the guaranteed loans. The 
evaluators observed, however, that a variety of unmeasured external (ex. general changes in the 
economy) and internal (ex. improved management skills) factors "caused" the changes reported in 
the performance of these firms. 
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The methodological problem of conducting a good borrower impact study is exemplified in 
a recent evaluation of the U.S. Small Business Administration guaranteed business loan program 
(Price Waterhouse). This study compared a sample of businesses that received SBA guaranteed 
loans in 1985 with a comparison sample of 1985 businesses of similar size and industry but that had 
never received a SBA loan. The borrowers tended to be newer entrants into the market, the SBA 
loans were reported to be used more than commercial loans to start a business rather than expand it, 
and a higher proportion ofSBA borrowers were still in business in 1989 compared to the comparison 
group. No statistical tests were reported, nor is there any discussion about how the response rates 
of 50 to 60 percent may bias the results. Another important problem is the fact that more SBA firms 
were new compared to the comparison group so the effects of "newness" cannot be separated from 
the effect of obtaining a guaranteed loan. 
IV. Conclusion and Implications 
We conclude that there is surprisingly little quantitative information to clearly support the 
use of guarantee schemes to stimulate lending in developing countries. Many studies of credit 
guarantees suffer from the same methodological weaknesses found in impact analysis of credit 
programs. More analysis is needed to determine if guarantees really produce the results that their 
designers expect, and ifthe benefits obtained justify the costs and subsidies involved. Attributing 
additionality to guarantee programs is difficult to ascertain with simple research designs, but more 
robust methodologies are costly, and require a great deal of data and talent to complete. Evaluating 
the revenues, costs and losses of guarantee funds is necessary to determine implicit subsidies and 
future viability. More attention is needed to evaluate the impact of guarantee schemes on lender 
behavior and the overall operation of financial markets, and less effort should be put into the difficult 
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task of assessing impact on borrowers. Resources should be concentrated on a few comprehensive 
evaluations of borrowers and lenders to learn if some of the fundamental assumptions about the 
impact of guarantees are correct. New methods need to be developed so lenders and borrowers can 
provide simple and inexpensive information useful for monitoring and evaluating guarantees. 
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